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INFO: DOMDS, DONOVA, EPO/LA, ODPB-B, ODPD-D, ACTION: NONE ODPN-N, ODPS-S, OPCTR/AFLA, RF, STATDICT, FILE, LA/CATFR, LA/CR-2, LA/NOG-5, LA/SANOG, ALA/MC/N-2, ALA/PO/LA, ICS/HC/LA, LA/CATFI, NCECF,

NCPM, NIO/LA, OGI/FSI/PI, PPS/INSC, (20/W)

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FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1320

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BT

EZ1:

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.

() Release KExcise () Deny () Declassify

Date 2 22 02 Exemption \_

( ) Classify as ( ) Extend as ( ) Downgrade to Con SAN JOSE 03973 Date 2/22/01 Declassify on 3/25/13 Reason

DEPARTMENT FOR S/S-O: A.M.

ALERT FOR ARA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, NU

SUBJECT: RESISTANCE VIEWS ON AGREEMENT WITH FSLN

REF: STATE 91576

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY:

DCM AND POLOFFS HAD SEPARATE MEETINGS MARCH 24 WITH

A TO DISCUSS THE SAPOA AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS. A DESCRIPTION OF THESE CONVERSATIONS FOLLOWS IN PARAGRAPHS BELOW. THE FOLLOWING IS A SYNOPSIS, KEYED TO THE REQUEST IN REFTEL FOR A READOUT ON SOME SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE SAPOA TALKS.

PLANS FOR TRAVEL TO MANAGUA:

ITHINKS ALL THE DIRECTORS SHOULD GO TO MANAGUA FOR THE APRIL 6 TALKS; SOME SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE NECOTIATIONS WHILE OTHERS ENGAGE IN PRELIMINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITIES.

-- ORGANIZATION AND MORALE OF MILITARY FORCES: FEW SPECIFICS HERE, BUT ( INDICATED

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THEY DID NOT SEE IT AS A PROBLEM. RESUPPLY:

RN TRAVEL PLANS: THESE ARE GENERALLY UP IN THE AIR. PLANS TO HAVE ALL THE DIRECTORS IN MIAMI OVER THE NEXT TWO-THREE DAYS HAVE SLIPPED DUE TO UNCERTAINTY OVER THE RN ASSEMBLY.

END SUMMARY.

-- DYNAMICS AND DETERMINING FACTORS: ACCORDING HUMBERTO ORTEGA SET THE TONE FOR THE TALKS THE FIRST DAY WHEN HE ADMITTED THE EPS COULD NOT DEFEAT THE RESISTANCE, AND THAT THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO AN AGREEMENT WAS A LONG, FRUITLESS WAR. SIMILARLY THE SANDINISTAS ABANDONED ANY PRETENSE OF INSISTENCE ON DISCUSSING ONLY MILITARY ASPECTS AND MADE CLEAR THEY NEEDED ONLY : A FACE-SAVING WAY TO ADDRESS POLITICAL TOPICS. THE NACHIEVED UNCONDITIONALLY THREE OF THE FIVE DEMANDS IN ITS PROPOSAL -- TRUCE AS OPPOSED TO A "DEFINITIVE" CEASEFIRE, PARTICIPATION IN INTERNAL DIALOGUE, FULL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION -- AND WON CONCESSIONS ON THE OTHER TWO -- AMNESTY AND MILITARY SERVICE. ON BALANCE: THINKS THE RN GOT A GOOD PACKAGE, AND HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT ANY DOUBTS AMONG HIS COLLEAGUES ON THIS SCORE WOULD FADE. AT THE SAME TIME, HE STRESSED THAT HE IS TAKING NOTHING ON FAITH, AND THAT MUCH HARD BARGAINING LIES AHEAD.

3. DESCRIBED THE SAPOA RESULTS IN OPTIMISTIC TERMS. ALTHOUGH HE CONCEDED THERE WAS MUCH HARD BARGAINING AHEAD AND STRESSED THAT THE SANDINISTAS HAD BY NO MEANS CONVINCED THE RN OF THEIR GOOD FAITH. DESCRIBING THE TALKS THEMSELVES, SAID THAT THE FIRST DAY HAD BEEN ESSENTIALLY ONE OF BREAKING THE ICE. ALSO, HUMBERTO ORTEGA HAD UNDERSCORED THE FSLN'S INTEREST IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT BY ASSERTING THAT NEITHER SIDE COULD DEFEAT THE OTHER MILITARILY, AND THAT WITHOUT AN ACCORD A LONG, FRUITLESS WAR LAY AHEAD. BELIEVES THAT, IN OFFERING THIS FORMULATION, ORTEGA WAS THINKING LESS OF RESISTANCE MILITARY PROWESS THAN OF THE NEGATIVE INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE SANDINISTA MARCH OFFENSIVE AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO THE U.S. MILITARY RESPONSE. IN ANY EVENT, IT EVENTUALLY BECAME OBVIOUS THAT THE

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CO PLUE WITH SAN FOSE

THAT LEFT AMNESTY. OVER WHICH THE HARDEST BARGAINING OCCURRED. THE RN FELT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO EXTRACT CONCESSIONS IN THIS AREA AS A VISIBLE DEMONSTRATION TO THE INTERNAL OPPOSITION AND NICARAGUAN SOCIETY OF THE RN'S LEVERAGE VIS-A-VIS THE FSLN. THE SANDINISTAS' PROPOSAL! HAD, IN EFFECT, LEFT IMPLEMENTATION OF AMNESTY TO THE CON'S DISCRETION. THE RN NEGOTIATORS INSISTED . ON IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF 200 PRISONERS. SANDINISTAS OFFERED 100. THE RN AGREED, BUT ONLY IF IT COULD SELECT THOSE TO BE FREED; THUS AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THIS STAGE. STILL. THERE REMAINED THE QUESTION OF THE BALANCE OF THE POLITICAL PRISONERS PLUS THE EX-GUARDIA MEMBERS. FOR A WHILE / THE FATE OF THE TALKS HUNG IN THE BALANCE OVER THESE. EVENTUALLY THE FORMULA THAT APPEARS IN THE ACCORD WAS AGREED UPON, BUT THIS SOLUTION WAS NOT UNANIMOUSLY ACCEPTED BY THE RN TEAM AND REMAINS A SORE POINT WITH SANCHEZ AND THE COMMANDANTES.

7. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION SAID HUMANITARIAN AID WOULD BE SUPPLIED BY A PRIVATE COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATION DESIGNATED BY THE RESISTANCE ITSELF. WHEN THE DCM SUGGESTED SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT,

LAUGHINGLY REJECTED THE POSSIBILITY, EXPLAINING THAT THE SANDINISTAS WOULD JUDGE THE NEUTRALITY OF THE RESISTANCE CHOICE. (NOTE: ACUERO HAD EARLIER EXPLAINED THAT THE RED CROSS NEED NOT BE CHOSEN, BUT HE DID NOT SUGGEST THAT A PRIVATE COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATION MUST BE CHOSEN.

UNITED ENTIRE SECTION 03 OF 04 SAN JOSE 03973 DEPARTMENT FOR S/S-O: A.M. ALERT FOR ARA E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, NU SUBJECT: RESISTANCE VIEWS ON AGREEMENT WITH FSLN ON BALANCE! IWAS PLEASED WITH THE SAPOA OUTCOME AND THOUGHT ANY DIFFERENCES OVER IT WITHIN THE RESISTANCE WOULD BE OVERCOME. INCLUDED IN THIS ESTIMATE WAS HIS JUDGMENT THAT THE MILITARY COMMANDERS WERE, OR WOULD EVENTUALLY BE, SATISFIED WITH THE ACCORD. ∴LOBSERVED THAT, OBVIOUSLY, THE RN DID NOT GET EVERYTHING IT WANTED. IN ADDITION TO YIELDING ON MILITARY SERVICE AND GIVING SOME GROUND ON AMNESTY, THE RN AGREED NOT TO INTRODUCE NEW LETHAL EQUIPMENT INTO NICARAGUA. ON THE OTHER HAND, ONE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT GAIN FOR THE RN WAS THE RIGHT TO REINTEGRATE IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY INTO NICARAGUAN POLITICAL LIFE. HE SEES FIRST STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION BEING TAKEN DURING THE NECOTIATIONS IN MANAGUA BEGINNING APRIL 6.

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